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TREATY GOVERNANCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIODIVERSITY 
 
John Linarelli∗  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past several decades international treaty regimes relevant to both biodiversity and 
intellectual property have proliferated.  The International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties in Plants, known as the UPOV Convention, came into existence in 1961 and was 
amended in 1978 and 1991.1  The UPOV Convention directs convention parties to grant plant 
breeder’s rights, a sui generis intellectual property right.  The International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, adopted in 1983, is a nonbinding agreement 
intended primarily to coordinate sustainable conservation of plant genetic resources by 
participating governments, and as part of this remit it promotes farmers’ rights.2  The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the international institution responsible for implementing the 
International Undertaking.  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), a multilateral agreement of the World Trade Organization, was concluded on 15 April 
1994 and entered into force on 1 January 1995.  Although an international trade agreement, 
TRIPS is relevant to the question of ownership of rights in genetic resources relating to 
biodiversity.  It specifies standards for the intellectual property laws of the WTO members.  The 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources became the second major instrument under the 
FAO umbrella to deal with intellectual property rights in plants.3  Adopted in November 2001, it 
is designed to supplant the International Undertaking.  This recent Treaty is not yet in force.  
When it comes into force, it has the potential to dwarf the CBD in its relevance to the 
intersection of intellectual property and biodiversity. 
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This article focuses on the United Nations Framework Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), concluded on 5 June 1992 at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit.4  The CBD is a 
multilateral convention.  As of the writing of this paper, 180 parties have ratified it. The 
European Union and all of its member states are parties to the CBD.  President Clinton signed 
the Convention, but the United States has not ratified it.  President Clinton submitted the 
Convention to the US Senate as is required under the US Constitution, but the Senate did not 
consent to it.  President Bush has no interest in promoting the CBD.   
 
The CBD is not designed as an agreement to define intellectual property rights.  Rather, it 
is an agreement to conserve global biodiversity.  To the extent that it says anything about 
intellectual property, it is in the context of its primary mission of trying to “mediate competing 
claims of industrialized and developing states.”5  The CBD states its three main objectives as: (i) 
the conservation of biological diversity; (ii) the sustainable use of the components of biological 
diversity; and (iii) the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic 
resources.6  Genetic resources are “genetic material of actual or potential value.”7   It is in the 
third objective, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from plant genetic resources, for which 
intellectual property concerns are of primary relevance. 
 
The regulation of intellectual property rights in resources associated with biodiversity is a 
major issue of global concern.  It would be difficult to challenge the argument that no other 
category of legal rules affects the distribution of wealth more than property rules.  The enclosure 
of the intellectual commons is occurring in various areas of science and technology, including in 
information technology and cyberspace, and in biotechnology relating to pharmaceuticals, 
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medicine and human genetics.  Property rights and agriculture share a longstanding historical 
relationship.  The endowments of any society are vitally connected to agriculture because 
agriculture is about food production.  The political economics of British agriculture in 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries produced the so-called first enclosure movement, in which 
commons in agricultural lands areas were enclosed and the rights of small farmers in estates such 
as copyholds were expropriated.8  While the conflict in the first enclosure movement was over 
rights in real property, the conflict in the second enclosure movement is rights in intellectual 
property.9  Similes and metaphors abound in the literature.  We are in the process of the 
“enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind” and the “intellectual land grab.”10  The battle 
for rights in intellectual property is “an information arms race with multiple sides battling for 
larger shares of the global knowledge pool.”11       
 
Evidence of the salience of the topic can be found in the fact that as this article is written, 
the CBD parties are meeting in Montreal to discuss the role of the CBD in the preservation of 
traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities.  The delegates are examining, 
among other things, “knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities 
relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity,”12 guidelines for conducting 
cultural, environmental and social impact assessments of development on sacred sites and on 
land that indigenous and local communities have traditionally used or occupied, and methods for 
increasing indigenous and local community participation in decision making concerning policies 
affecting traditional knowledge.13 
 
 The organization of this article is as follows.  Part I explains what biodiversity is, in brief 
terms.  Part II summarizes why it is important.  Part III examines the main CBD articles relevant 
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to intellectual property.  Part IV explores how the CBD differs from other treaty regimes that 
deal with intellectual property.   Part IV characterizes international agreements that deal with 
intellectual property and biodiversity as either property-oriented or commons oriented.  
 
 
I. WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY? 
 There are many definitions of biodiversity.  Biodiversity is short for biological diversity.  
CBD Article 2 defines biological diversity as “the variability among living organisms from all 
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems.”14  In its 1992 Global Biodiversity Strategy, the World Resources Institute of the 
World Conservation Union and United Nations Environment Programme defines biodiversity as 
“the totality of genes, species, and ecosystems in a region.”15   There are thus three “hierarchical 
categories” to which the “diversity” label affixes: diversity of genes, diversity of species and 
diversity of ecosystems.16   
 
Genetic diversity “refers to the variation of genes within species.”17  It includes “distinct 
populations of the same species (such as the thousands of traditional rice varieties in India) or 
genetic variation within a population (high among Indian rhinos, and very low among 
cheetahs).”18  An example of genetic diversity in California are genetic differences in Douglas fir 
along the coast as opposed to those found in the Sierra mountains.  Firs exhibit genetic 
adaptations to local conditions such as the summer fog along the coast or hot summer days in the 
Sierra.19   Same species – Douglas fir – but genetically different.   
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Species diversity “refers to the variety of species within a region.”20  Scientists use 
various measures to assess species diversity, such as “species richness" or a more precise 
measurement, "taxonomic diversity", which also considers the relationship between species.  The 
World Resources Institutes provides as an example of taxonomic diversity, “an island with two 
species of birds and one species of lizard has a greater taxonomic diversity than an island with 
three species of birds but no lizards.”21   
 
Ecosystem diversity is defined by communities or associations of species.22  A good 
example of ecosystem diversity can be found in the Ynyslas estuary in Wales, a combination of 
grasslands, wetlands, rivers, an estuary, fresh and salt water, and the largest peat bog in Europe.   
 
How does intellectual property relate to biodiversity?  To put it very simply, firms who 
develop pharmaceutical products plant varieties or agricultural biotechnology can develop new 
products from genetic resources found in biodiversity.  There are many examples, too many to 
discuss here.23  
 
II. WHY IS BIODIVERSITY PRESERVATION IMPORTANT? 
 Though the answer to this question seems self evident, it is not.  The reasons are mired in 
politics.  Legal rules alone do not provide answers.  I provide a way of conceptualizing reasons 
offered for or against biodiversity conservation.  Relying on moral philosophy, the reasons fall 
into three categories: consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethical. I provide here summary 
and perhaps over simplistic illustrations of how these three approaches work to answer the 
question why biodiversity preservation is or is not important.  These methods are not totally 
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distinct from each other, but are presented here as stark contrasts in order to explain their 
differences.  In addition, there is plenty of political philosophy that provides other ways of 
examining the issues.24  
 
 Consequentialist thinking about biodiversity (or anything else, for that matter) concerns 
itself with the effects of given states of affairs.  A consequentialist is willing to weigh tradeoffs 
or to engage in cost-benefit analysis.  Utilitarianism and economics are consequential approaches 
to inquiring about public policy.   
 
To the economist, the question is one of weighing costs and benefits to reach an efficient 
collective choice.  An economist asks the question whether the social benefits of preserving a 
particular gene sequence, species or ecosystem outweigh its social costs.  If the social costs 
associated with the preservation of a particular rare chaparral are greater than the social benefits 
from destroying a range the chaparral to build badly needed housing in southern California, then, 
from an economic point of view, it would be more efficient to build the houses and destroy the 
chaparral.  Most economists argue that cost-benefit analysis is a tool for positive analysis and at 
most a decision procedure to help governments take decisions.  To the economist, the actual 
decision is political and beyond the realm of the economics. 
 
There are various approaches to utilitarianism but the utilitarian asks a question similar to 
that of the economist: which choice – the houses or the chaparral – produce the most happiness 
in society?  From a Benthamite perspective of pleasures and pains, which collective choice 
yields the greatest pleasure and the least pain?  Here, we might get the same result as the 
economist, though this is not always the case. 
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A deontologist might find the above analysis unacceptable.  A deontological approach is 
one that we might find a nongovernmental organization or an ecologist taking.  To a 
deontologist, it is morally or ethically wrong to destroy a rare plant species, regardless of the 
consequences.  We have a duty to protect rare plant species, and it is wrong to destroy them.  
That a substantial community of humans may benefit from the destruction of habitat is irrelevant.  
Environmental deontologists do not carry the day in most governments and international 
institutions, as the managerial approach of cost-benefit analysis tends to be more influential, 
particularly because politicians must answer to voters. 
 
Virtue ethics is a revival of the Aristotelian approach to ethics, to looking at properties of 
character, such as courage, temperance, prudence and justice.  Applying virtue ethics in the 
public realm, to produce a so-called “public morality” has encountered some difficulties, but so 
have utilitarianism and deontology.25  Legal principles can reflect virtues.26    Virtue ethics 
would likely ask whether the decision to build the houses (or preserve the chaparral) is just or 
consistent with some other virtue. 
 
I have outlined in a very brief way three decision procedures for answering the question 
why biodiversity is important but I have not actually answered the question.  The answer 
depends on which decision procedure we choose.  A utilitarian might well accept substantial 
degradation of biodiversity if the sum of satisfactions or benefits from such degradation exceeds 
its displeasures or costs.  An economist would take a similar approach.  A deontologist cannot 
accept breaches of moral duties to protect the environment unless there is some rule that permits 
derogation, but a deontologist would be hard pressed to allow any substantial degradation.  A 
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virtuous person would ask whether biodiversity preservation (or degradation) furthers a virtue 
such as justice or prudence.  The hard cases at the margins is where the ethical approach one 
chooses matters. 
 
Various strands of each theory exist in the text of the CBD.  Such interpretations are 
mired in ambiguity, but a few examples can be given.  The very first paragraph of the 
Convention states that the parties have agreed to the Convention “[c]onscious of the intrinsic 
value of biological diversity and of the ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, 
educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its 
components.”27  The “intrinsic value” of biological diversity suggests a deontological approach 
while the remainder of the paragraph, with its reference to values external to biological diversity 
suggest a consequentialist approach.  This is a common way of expressing values about 
biodiversity.  One commentator expresses the value of biodiversity in consequential terms in this 
way: 
Biological diversity is important because it is a repository of genetic information 
gained through long processes of biological evolution.  Biological diversity is 
valued both for its potential use (for instance, as a source of new drugs or crops) 
and for its aesthetic contribution.  The value derived from biological diversity (for 
instance, cancer-curing drugs and disease-resistant crops) far exceeds the world 
investment in conservation.28 
 
On the other hand, the language in the CBD on ”fair and equitable” sharing of benefits arising 
from the use of biological diversity suggests a virtue ethical or deontological approach, looking 
to concepts of justice in determining sharing allocations.29  It is the clash of choices – between 
fairness in sharing the benefits of the use of biodiversity and maximizing use – that can create 
the interesting problems.  If we only take into account how we can put biodiversity to its greatest 
use, then we will permit large multinational corporations to use traditional knowledge developed 
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over centuries by indigenous communities to develop patented technologies without paying any 
compensation to the indigenous community, since a greater good – say cheap medicine or a 
virus-resistant corn – may produce benefits that far outweigh any losses to the indigenous 
community. It would be worth examining this point using the Rawlsian difference principle.30  
Indeed, in the absence of destruction of endangered genetic resources, we could argue that the 
indigenous community has suffered no loss if it is still able to use its traditional knowledge in the 
same way as before, unless we are willing to count foregone opportunity costs as a loss, even 
where the community could not convert the traditional knowledge to a patentable innovation 
without the assistance of the multinational.  More empirical work needs to be done in order to 
come up with proper conclusions using the framework set forth above.  I have taken only a 
tentative and general step.  The main concern, however, seems more connected to environmental 
regulation than intellectual property law: the destruction of plant genetic resources as a result of 
urbanization and other socio-economic conditions may reduce the availability of genetic 
resources for innovation in the form of intellectual property. 
 
 
III. THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
A. Introduction 
 
Nations began negotiations in earnest for a global biodiversity convention in earnest in 
1991.31  These negotiations began one year before the planned United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development “Earth Summit” in Rio, held in June 1992.32  One of the major 
agreements signed at Rio 1992 was the CBD.  The CBD went into force on 10 July 1996, with 
the ratification of Cyprus as the thirtieth party to ratify, accede or approve the Convention.33 
 10
 
Intellectual property falls with the scope of the CBD but it is clearly not the only subject 
of concern.  One of the more recent and notable developments in CBD governance was the 
adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.34  The Protocol came into force on 11 
September 2003.  The Protocol regulates international trade in genetically modified organisms.  
It is a key treaty instrument in the pending WTO dispute settlement proceeding that the United 
States, Canada and Argentina have brought against the EU.  One of the EU’s main defenses will 
likely be that its actions to restrict the importation of genetically modified foods were designed   
to comply with the Cartagena Protocol.  We may thus see a question with serious implications 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body as to the consistency of multilateral trade agreements 
with a multilateral environmental agreement.  Notably, Argentina, Canada, and the United States 
are not parties to the Cartagena Protocol.  The pending dispute before the WTO has nothing to do 
with intellectual property.  
 
B. The Intellectual Property Provisions 
 
The CBD is comprised of forty-two articles and two annexes.  This part explains the parts 
of the Convention relevant to intellectual property.      
 
The Preamble sets forth the values underlying the Convention.  As explained above, the 
Preamble identifies the “intrinsic value” of biodiversity as well as its “ecological, genetic, social, 
economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and aesthetic values.”35  These values 
have to be interpreted with reference to two constraints.  First, the idea of sovereign equality. 
The Preamble states that the contracting parties reaffirm “that States have sovereign rights over 
their own biological resources.”36  Second, fair and equitable sharing of the benefits of biological 
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diversity, arguably including benefits that have been converted to intellectual property.  The 
Preamble states that the contracting parties recognize “the close and traditional dependence of 
many indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, 
and the desirability of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable 
use of its components,”37 and acknowledge that “special provision is required to meet the needs 
of developing countries, including the provision of new and additional financial resources and 
appropriate access to relevant technologies,” particularly for “least developed countries and 
small island States.”38   Consistently with the Preamble, Article 1 identifies the objectives of the 
Convention, as:  
the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and 
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over 
those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.39 
 
These provisions inform the remaining articles of the Convention on intellectual property, as will 
be shown below.  
 
Traditional knowledge is not a legally recognized form of intellectual property in its own 
right. In Article 8, dealing with in-situ conservation,40 Article 8(j) sets forth a provision on 
traditional knowledge. It provides that CBD contracting parties “shall, as far as possible and 
appropriate” and subject to national legislation:  
respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their 
wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 




Further, CBD Article 10(c) provides that contracting parties shall, as far as possible and 
appropriate, “[p]rotect and encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with 
traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or sustainable use 
requirements.”42 
  
The primary obligations of countries rich in biodiversity, such as developing countries, 
are to provide access, and Article 15 identifies the characteristics of the laws and institutions to 
regulate such access.43  For those countries whose persons obtain access, Article 16 identifies the 
characteristics of the laws and institutions to regulate the transfer of technological innovation to 
the countries from which the genetic resources are obtained.44  The CBD takes a top-down state-
oriented approach to controlling access to genetic resources.  The CBD approach is to rely on 
contractual arrangements between countries rich in biodiversity and persons (usually firms) who 
want access.  It relies on a traditional regulatory model of governance, typically used for the 
regulation of foreign direct investment; though now out of favor because many governments now 
see benefits of free flow of capital into their countries.  Regulation of the availability of plant 
genetic resources to outside prospectors, however, may be preferable if regulatory institutions do 
not suffer from too many public choice ills.  Regulation should be designed so that the 
development of intellectual property from biodiversity does not result simply in an extraction 
process with few if any benefits flowing to indigenous and local communities. 
 
Under the CBD, states have “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant 
to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
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jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.”45  CBD Article 15 implements this sovereign equality 
mandate. CBD Article 15.1 states, “[r]ecognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural 
resources, the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national 
governments and is subject to national legislation.”46 CBD Article 15.4 provides that “[a]ccess, 
where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to the provisions of this Article” 
and Article 15.5 provides that “[a]ccess to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed 
consent of the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by that 
Party.”47  
 
Various provisions of the CBD are concerned with the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits of genetic resources and the results of research and development relating to genetic 
resources, but provide few if any details on how to achieve such benefit sharing.  Article 15.6 
requires contracting parties to “endeavour to develop and carry out scientific research based on 
genetic resources provided by other Contracting Parties with the full participation of, and where 
possible in, such Contracting Parties.”48   Article 15.7 requires contracting parties to share in a 
fair and equitable way “the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the 
commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing such 
resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.”49  Article 19 concerns the sharing 
of benefits and is to be read in conjunction with Article 15. Article 19.1 requires CBD 
contracting parties to “take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, to 
provide for the effective participation in biotechnological research activities by those Contracting 
Parties, especially developing countries, which provide the genetic resources for such research, 
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and where feasible in such Contracting Parties.”50 Article 19.2 requires contracting parties to 
“take all practicable measures to promote and advance priority access on a fair and equitable 
basis by Contracting Parties, especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising 
from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting Parties. Such 
access shall be on mutually agreed terms.”51  
 
For those countries whose persons obtain access, Article 16 identifies the characteristics 
of the laws and institutions to regulate the transfer of technological innovation to the countries 
from which the genetic resources are obtained.52  In addition to the sharing of the benefits of 
research and development in genetic resources, the CBD contains various obligations governing 
the transfer of technologies that result from such research and development.  Article 16.2 
provides that the transfer of technology to developing countries “shall be provided and/or 
facilitated under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms 
where mutually agreed, and, where necessary, in accordance with the financial mechanism 
established by Articles 20 and 21.”53  Article 20 obligates developed countries to provide 
financial resources to developing countries to enable the developing countries to comply with the 
CBD.  Article 21 requires the creation of a “financial mechanism,” which the CBD Conference 
of the Parties is to manage, to dispense these financial resources. Finally, contracting parties are 
required to “take legislative, administrative or policy measures with the aim that the private 
sector facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of technology ... for the benefit of both 
governmental institutions and the private sector of developing countries ....”54  
 
The CBD deals explicitly with intellectual property rights in three potentially conflicting 
provisions. According to CBD Article 16.5, “[t]he Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents 
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and other intellectual property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this 
Convention, shall cooperate ... subject to national legislation and international law in order to 
ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives.”55  Under CBD 
Article 16.2, access to and transfer of technology to developing countries “shall be provided on 
terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of 
intellectual property rights.”56  CBD Article 16.3 requires contracting parties to “take legislative, 
administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, with the aim that Contracting Parties, in 
particular those that are developing countries which provide genetic resources, are provided 
access to and transfer of technology which makes use of those resources, on mutually agreed 
terms, including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights where 
necessary, ... and consistent with paragraphs 4 and 5 ....”57  These provisions are ambiguous as to 
whether the intellectual property rights will have to be altered to accommodate the transfer of 
technology to developing countries under the Convention. 
 
 
C. The Bonn Guidelines 
 
There have been a number of Decisions of the Conference of the Parties.  A recent and 
notable one is the Bonn Guidelines, entitled “Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit 
Sharing.”58  The Guidelines were drafted in the fourth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, 
held at Bonn in October 2001, and adopted at the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, 
held at the Hague in April 2002.59  The Guidelines are just that – guidelines – they are voluntary 
and do not set forth the kind of mandatory language that lawyers place in instruments.  Many of 
the contracting parties are developing countries, rich in biodiversity but poor in institutional 
capabilities needed to manage biodiversity in a sustainable way.  The Bonn Guidelines 
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essentially seek to provide details to national governments on how to implement the above CBD 
articles relevant to intellectual property.  The Guidelines more clearly define the kinds of roles 
that national bodies may take in implementing the CBD provisions on access and benefit sharing.  
They make recommendations that are designed to make governments more attuned to 
stakeholder interests.   Brief discussion of the Guidelines is set forth here. 
One of the major tasks governments face in implementing the CBD is in producing a set 
of institutions for implementing the prior informed consent requirement of CBD Article 15.5.  
The Bonn Guidelines deal with this issue.  They recommend the “basic principles of a prior 
informed consent system, which include “legal certainty and clarity,” “access to genetic 
resources . . . at minimum cost,” transparency in restrictions on access to genetic resources and 
the basing of such restrictions on “legal grounds,” and “[t]he consent of relevant stakeholders, 
such as indigenous and local communities, as appropriate to the circumstances and subject to 
domestic law. . . .”60  The Guidelines list the elements of a prior informed consent system as 
including the various kinds of features of a public institution that relate to natural justice or due 
process.61  They recommend procedures for the application process for prior informed consent.62 
Another major task that governments face in implementing the CBD is in coming up with 
a set of “mutually agreed terms” for access to genetic resources within their borders, as CBD 
Article 15.7 mandates.  The Guidelines recommend basic requirements for mutually agreed 
terms, such as the development of standard form agreements and procedures for efficient 
negotiation of agreements.63  The Guidelines recommend “minimization of transaction costs” 
through the undertaking of efforts to promote awareness of “the Government's and relevant 
stakeholders' requirements for prior informed consent and contractual arrangements, of “existing 
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mechanisms for applying for access, entering into arrangements and ensuring the sharing of 
benefits.”64  Transaction costs could be further minimized by developing “framework 
agreements, under which repeat access under expedited arrangements can be made; and 
“standardized material transfer agreements and benefit-sharing arrangements for similar 
resources and similar uses.”65  Appendix I of the Guidelines sets forth “suggested elements” for 
such an agreement. 
The Guidelines further provide an “indicative list of typical mutually agreed terms,” 
which include the following: 
a. Type and quantity of genetic resources, and the geographical/ecological 
area of activity;  
b. Any limitations on the possible use of the material;  
c. Recognition of the sovereign rights of the country of origin;  
d. Capacity-building in various areas to be identified in the agreement;  
e. A clause on whether the terms of the agreement in certain circumstances 
(e.g. change of use) can be renegotiated;  
f. Whether the genetic resources can be transferred to third parties and 
conditions to be imposed in such cases, e.g. whether or not to pass genetic 
resources to third parties without ensuring that the third parties enter into 
similar agreements except for taxonomic and systematic research that is not 
related to commercialization;  
g. Whether the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities have been respected, preserved and maintained, and whether the 
customary use of biological resources in accordance with traditional practices 
has been protected and encouraged;  
h. Treatment of confidential information;  
i. Provisions regarding the sharing of benefits arising from the commercial 
and other utilization of genetic resources and their derivatives and products.66 
The Guidelines provide substantial guidance on how to implement the benefit 
sharing features of the CBD.  Appendix II provides a detailed list of the following 
potential monetary benefits: 
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a. Access fees/fee per sample collected or otherwise acquired;  
b. Up-front payments;  
c. Milestone payments;  
d. Payment of royalties;  
e. Licence fees in case of commercialization;  
f. Special fees to be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity;  
g. Salaries and preferential terms where mutually agreed;  
h. Research funding;  
i. Joint ventures;  
j. Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.67 
And a detailed list of potential non-monetary benefits: 
a. Sharing of research and development results;  
b. Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in scientific research and 
development programmes, particularly biotechnological research activities, 
where possible in the provider country;  
c. Participation in product development;  
d. Collaboration, cooperation and contribution in education and training;  
e. Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases;  
f. Transfer to the provider of the genetic resources of knowledge and technology 
under fair and most favourable terms, including on concessional and 
preferential terms where agreed, in particular, knowledge and technology that 
make use of genetic resources, including biotechnology, or that are relevant to 
the conservation and sustainable utilization of biological diversity;  
g. Strengthening capacities for technology transfer to user developing country 
Parties and to Parties that are countries with economies in transition and 
technology development in the country of origin that provides genetic 
resources. Also to facilitate abilities of indigenous and local communities to 
conserve and sustainably use their genetic resources;  
h. Institutional capacity-building;  
i. Human and material resources to strengthen the capacities for the 
administration and enforcement of access regulations;  
j. Training related to genetic resources with the full participation of providing 
Parties, and where possible, in such Parties;  
k. Access to scientific information relevant to conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, including biological inventories and taxonomic 
studies;  
l. Contributions to the local economy;  
m. Research directed towards priority needs, such as health and food security, 
taking into account domestic uses of genetic resources in provider countries;  
n. Institutional and professional relationships that can arise from an access and 
benefit-sharing agreement and subsequent collaborative activities;  
o. Food and livelihood security benefits;  
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p. Social recognition;  
q. Joint ownership of relevant intellectual property rights.68 
Note that “joint ownership of intellectual property rights” is the last on the latter two lists.  
The Guidelines admit to a foundation premise of the CBD, that an intellectual property rights 
regime need not be the only way to allocate the benefits of biodiversity. 
 Finally, the Bonn Guidelines recommend that national patent offices require disclosure of 
the country of origin of genetic resources and of “traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and location communities.”69   How this recommendation will work itself 
out within the CBD institutions remains to be seen. 
 
IV. COMPARING THE CBD TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: DIVERGENT MODELS OF 
TREATY GOVERNANCE 
  
 As should be evident, the CBD is not an intellectual property treaty.  It does not even say 
that intellectual property rights have to be granted to stakeholders in developing countries, even 
if they developed the traditional knowledge that led to the discovery that is being 
commercialized by a multinational firm.  The CBD reflects one way of regulating innovation 
related to biodiversity.  The relevant international agreements are of two kinds: property-oriented 
agreements and commons-oriented agreements.  Property-oriented agreements are traditional in 
their identification of intellectual property rights and standards for such rights.  Examples of such 
agreements are TRIPS, the European Patent Convention and the UPOV Convention.  These 
property-oriented treaties are examined in Section A below.   Commons-oriented treaties are 
designed more like the CBD.  They do not focus solely on intellectual property rights; instead 
they conceptualize the concern as one of management of rights of access to biodiversity and in 
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sharing of benefits of various stakeholders.   Examples of such agreements are the CBD, the 
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources and the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources. The latter two agreements are examined in Section B below. 
 




 TRIPS is one of the most important international agreements relevant to the allocation 
of rights in genetic resources in biodiversity.  Although an agreement that is supposed to 
regulate international trade, it specifies substantive standards for the intellectual property laws 
of the WTO members. It is unlike any other trade agreement preceding it, unlike anything 
produced in the GATT/WTO framework since the GATT's humble beginnings as a 
provisional agreement to regulate tariffs.70  TRIPS harmonizes intellectual property protection 
at a high level of protection for rights holders, and this is one of its controversial 
characteristics. Another is that it shifts the locus of international regulation of intellectual 
property rights to the WTO from other international regulatory regimes, such as the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a United Nations organization, and the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties in Plants.71  
 
The key TRIPS provision relevant to intellectual property rights in biodiversity is Article 
27, entitled “Patentable Subject Matter.”  Article 27 provides that patents “shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”72  WTO members must make 
patents available in their territories “without discrimination . . . as to the field of technology.”73  
Three exceptions exist to this “any technology” standard for patentability.  Article 27.2 provides 
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that WTO members may exclude from patentability inventions, “the prevention within their 
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, 
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law.”74  Article 27.3 provides that members may exclude from patentability 
(a) "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals” and (b) 
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes.”75  
Further, under subparagraph (b), WTO members may provide for the protection of plant varieties 
either by patents, or by an “effective sui generis system” or by a combination of the two 
methods.76 
 
One of the basic distinctions between sui generis protection and patents is that sui generis 
rights tend to be subject to various exemptions, such as a research exemption such exceptions.  
They would fall, at least implicitly, within the sui generis category of protection permitted under 
Article 27.3(b).  In addition, TRIPS Article 30 provides that “[m]embers may provide limited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.”77  Thus, Article 30 could be interpreted to permit such exemptions even for patented 
seeds and plants.78  
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Article 27 was negotiated in the Uruguay Round to substantially adopt the wording of 
Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention, but important differences maintain.   The 
European Patent Convention Article 53 provides: 
European patents shall not be granted in respect of: 
(a) inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be 
contrary to “ordre public” or morality, provided that the exploitation shall not be 
deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in 
some or all of the Contracting States; 
(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological 
processes or the products thereof.79 
Convention Article 53 uses the term “shall” when referring to exclusions from patentability of 
plant varieties, but TRIPS Article 27 uses the term “may.”  The European Patent Convention 
excludes from eligibility for European patents rights in plant and animal varieties, and 
"essentially biological processes" for plant and animal production, but leaves the door open for 
rights in microbiological processes.  By contrast, Article 27 leaves the policy choice to WTO 
members to use patents, sui generis rights, or both, to protect rights in plants and animal 
varieties.  WTO members, in addition, may exclude from patentability "essentially biological 
processes" for plant and animal production, but not for the production of micro-organisms, or 
rights in non-biological and microbiological processes.  TRIPS and the European Patent 
Convention are consistent.     
 2. The European Patent Convention 
The Convention on the Grant of European Patents, popularly known as the European 
Patent Convention, came into existence on 5 October 1973 in Munich.  It has thus been in 
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existence long before TRIPS, and, as explained above, it in part formed the basis for language 
used in TRIPS Article 27.3(b).  The members of the Convention include the EU member states in 
their capacities outside of the EU system.  The Convention is not part of the EU legal system.  In 
addition, five other European states not in the EU are members of the Convention: Cyprus, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Switzerland and Turkey.  With a single application to the European 
Patent Office (EPO) established under the Convention, an inventor can obtain patent protection 
in all countries that are members of the Convention.  The European level Convention and its 
registration system co-exist with national patent laws and national registration systems.  The 
European patent is valid in the countries that are members of the Convention, but the 
interpretation and enforcement of the patents are issues for national law.80     
As explained above, Convention Article 53(b) provides that “European patents shall not 
be granted in respect of . . . plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the 
products thereof.”81  The term “varieties” is not defined in the Convention.  The travaux 
préparatoires of the Convention indicates that plant varieties were excluded from patent 
protection principally because sui generis protection existed under the UPOV Convention, then 
in its 1971 version, and under national laws implementing the UPOV Convention.82  When the 
European Patent Convention was drafted, plants and animals were not patentable because 
breeding did not result in plants and animals that could be reproduced.  Genetic engineering has 
advanced since the early 1970s to the point where the reproducibility objection no longer exists, 
and patenting is a feasible option for protection of inventions in plant and animal varieties.83  The 
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decision of the European Patent Office Enlarged Board of Appeal in Novartis Transgenic Plant 
is a movement in that direction.    
The Convention contains grounds for denying patent applications on moral grounds 
substantially similar to the standard found in TRIPS Article 27.2.  Convention Article 53(a) 
prohibits the grant of patents in Europe whose invention, publication and exploitation would be 
contrary to ordre public or morality.84   
 
 
3. The UPOV Convention 
 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 
Convention) was signed in Paris in 1961 and revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991.  The Convention 
established the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.85  When the 
European Patent Convention was drafted in the early 1970s, the UPOV Convention required 
signatories to use plant variety rights as the exclusive means of protection of rights in plant 
varieties.  The UPOV Convention was amended in 1991 to freely permit countries to use patents, 
plant variety rights or both to protect rights in plant varieties.  The 1991 Convention represents a 
substantial revision, in that it freely permits dual protection of plant varieties, by patents, sui 
generis rights or both.86  The original 1961 Convention required signatories to choose one form 
of protection for “one and the same botanical genus or species,” either patents or sui generis 
rights.  The 1978 Convention relaxed this restriction to permit countries such as the US and 
Japan to continue to provide dual protection if they had provided it before 31 October 1979.  The 




B. The Main Commons-Oriented Agreement: The International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources 
 
 The agreements that more specifically deal with plant genetic resources are to be 
contrasted with the traditional international agreements that deal with intellectual property.  
These former agreements are managed by the FAO.  They were, initially, the International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, a nonbinding agreement that 
will, subsequently, be superseded by the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture.  The basics of these agreements are discussed here. 
 The first of these agreements, the International Undertaking, was the principal instrument 
within the FAO system for the regulation of intellectual property rights in plant genetic 
resources, until the International Treaty was signed.88  The International Treaty is not yet in 
force, so the status of the International Undertaking is uncertain.  The International Undertaking 
was adopted in 1983.  It was initially proposed as legally binding, but the parties could not reach 
agreement.  It was adopted as a voluntary set of principles.89  It was a weak set of general 
principles.  Article 1 of the International Undertaking sets forth its fundamental operating 
concept:  “The Undertaking is based on the universally accepted principle that plant genetic 
resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction.”90  
That a commons approach to plant genetic resources as a “universally accepted principle” in 
1983, the year that the International Undertaking was adopted, is debatable.  The UPOV 
Convention, which came into force in 1961, provides that countries may provide for a sui generis 
right in plant varieties known as plant breeders’ rights.  Plant breeders are located mainly in the 
developed countries.91   This presented a set of property rules in which plant genetic resources 
that were not worked by breeders were commons property free for the taking, while plant genetic 
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resources that were worked into a breeder’s right enjoyed protection.92  Resolution 4/89 of the 
International Undertaking, agreed during an 11-29 November 1989 FAO Conference, states that 
“Plant Breeders’ Rights, as provided for under UPOV . . .  are not incompatible with the 
International Undertaking,” but Resolution 5/89, adopted in the same conference, endorsed the 
concept of Farmers’ Rights, which are “rights arising from the past, present and future 
contributions of farmers in conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic resources, 
particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity.”93    As the FAO explains:  
Throughout the world, farmers and their communities have developed a vast 
portfolio of genetic diversity within crops and other plant species, which form the 
raw material for all agricultural activity. Modern plant breeding, in fact, builds on 
plant germplasm resources that have been traditionally developed and donated by 
farmers. Over the millennia, crops have been shared between regions, so that all 
countries are now interdependent, in that they rely for agriculture and food 
security, on crops that are cultivated elsewhere.94  
 The International Treaty grew from the International Undertaking and seven years of 
negotiations.  Signed in November 2001, it has yet to come into force.  It will come into force on 
the ninetieth day after the fortieth ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.95  As of the 
date of this writing, the FAO has received thirty-three instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession,96 so the Treaty is likely to come into force soon.  The Treaty has the 
potential to become the most important among the array of agreements that deal with intellectual 
property and biodiversity, though its first article identifies the need for integration with the CBD.  
The objectives of the Treaty include “the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising” from 
the use of plant genetic resources, “in harmony with” the CBD.97  Treaty objectives “will be 
attained by closely linking” the Treaty to the CBD.98  Commentators have described the “most 
noteworthy feature” of the International Treaty,99 its “central achievement,”100 its “multilateral 
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system.”  The multilateral system is the key access provision of the International Treaty.  The 
multilateral system provides for “facilitated access” to plant genetic resources.  The relevant 
plant genetic resources are comprised of a list of key food and feed crops, identified in Annex 1 
to the International Treaty.  The genetic resources for these crops are held in seed banks.  Private 
persons have access to the plant materials for the crops on the list, but if they commercialize 
products from the materials they must pay a percentage of profits to a trust account, and the trust 
funds must be used for fair and equitable benefit sharing through “information exchange, 
technology transfer, capacity building and allocation of monetary benefits from 
commercialization.”101  The details are suppressed here in the interests of brevity, including the 
requirements of material transfer agreements,102 but one more point bears mention.  Article 
12.3(d) provides that access is conditioned on the following: “Recipients shall not claim any 
intellectual property or other rights that limit the facilitated access to the plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture, or their genetic parts or components, in the form received from the 
Multilateral System.”103  The scope of this language will be one of the more interesting questions 
for implementation once the Treaty is in force.   
   
CONCLUSION 
 
Which approach is the more sound?  Should there be more or fewer intellectual property 
rights in plant genetic resources?  A general yes or no answer probably does not exist.  The 
question cannot be answered in the absence of rigorous empirical investigation.  As a recent 
study prepared for the European Commission explains, “[a]t present, there is no data that 
convincingly links IPRs to improved conservation of genetic resources.  There is not even 
convincing data that situates IPRs into a more effective policy environment to conserve genetic 
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resources.”104  The research needs to be done.  It need not be strictly quantitative and reliant on 
econometric techniques.  Case studies and qualitative surveys, using techniques from new 
institutional economics, may be helpful.  Second, there may be no general answer to this 
question even if we had better information.  Intellectual property approaches may work in some 
cases and not in others.   
 
What is the goal?  The answer to this question will determine one’s position on the 
subject.  If one’s goal is to conserve biodiversity so that we can use it to maximize human 
welfare, then one might be more inclined to grant intellectual property rights and not worry too 
much about indigenous communities.  If we were to adopt an economic approach (a kind of 
consequentialism), then we would ask how we would maximize the benefits of biodiversity at 
the point where social benefits equal social costs.  In this economic calculus, we may be willing 
to sacrifice some biodiversity, if the cost of preserving it exceeds the benefits of preservation.  
Deontologists object to these approaches, claiming that it is morally wrong to use technologies 
developed by others without compensation, and that it is wrong to harm biodiversity to make 
humans who happen to live in this time period better off.  These sorts of questions are of a 
threshold nature and must be dealt with before we attempt serious answers to the question 
whether or not intellectual property rights are advantageous or not. 
 
What we do know at this point is that there are a variety of sometimes competing and 
sometimes coordinating international arrangements that say various things about intellectual 
property rights and biodiversity.  Though it would seem that the trend is towards 
commercialization and more property rights,105 it remains to be seen whether the CBD and the 
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new FAO International Treaty will produce substantial benefit sharing regimes that account for 
the interests of stakeholders beyond those recognized in traditional intellectual property rights.  
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